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ESTABLISHING AN EQUAL PLAYING FIELD
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF UNITED STATES V.
SINGLETON
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INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit announced its opinion in United States v. Singleton
(“Singleton I”),1 declaring that federal prosecutors violate the federal
gratuity statute when they offer plea bargains to criminal defendants
in exchange for testimony against other criminal defendants.2 Only
nine days after this stunning opinion was issued, the Tenth Circuit va-
cated Singleton I for a rehearing of the case en banc.3 In January of
1999, the Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in United States v. Singleton
(“Singleton II”),4 overruling Singleton I and holding that federal
prosecutors do not violate the federal gratuity statute by exchanging
plea bargains for testimony because the statute does not apply to the
government or its agents.5 During the six months between Singleton I
and Singleton II, over four dozen courts published opinions on
whether exchanging reduced sentences for testimony violates the fed-
eral gratuity statute.6 The high level of judicial activity during this
brief period demonstrates the sizable impact that the Singleton I
holding had on the legal system.
1. 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Singleton I].
2. See id. at 1357-58.
3. See id. at 1361.
4. 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999) [hereinafter Sin-
gleton II].
5. See id. at 1298.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999); United States v. Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209-10 (D.N.J.
1998) (collecting cases).
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The federal gratuity statute is part of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2),
which proscribes bribery and gratuity. Bribery and gratuity offenses
both involve illegally exchanging something of value for some action
or behavior, such as payment made to a politician in exchange for her
vote in favor of a bill. Bribery and gratuity are distinguished from one
another by the intent requirement of each offense. Bribery requires
that the person making the offer intend to induce corrupt action or
behavior from the recipient.7 Gratuity involves essentially the same
conduct as bribery but is a lesser offense because it does not require
that the offeror actually intend to cause corruption.8 A prosecutor
who offers to reduce a convicted felon’s prison sentence in exchange
for the felon’s knowingly false testimony against another criminal de-
fendant is guilty of bribery under subsection 201(c)(1). The question
at issue in the Singleton cases was whether a prosecutor commits the
offense of gratuity, proscribed by subsection 201(c)(2), by offering a
criminal defendant a reduced sentence in exchange for what the
prosecutor believes will be truthful testimony against another defen-
dant.
Although the holding in Singleton I was quickly vacated and re-
placed by the contrary holding of Singleton II, the Singleton I panel
opened the door to a line of reasoning and argument—that federal
plea bargains are illegal under the gratuity statute—that will likely re-
surface frequently until the Supreme Court issues an opinion on the
appropriate interpretation and application of subsection 201(c)(2).9
The decision in Singleton II, which accords with most case law inter-
preting subsection 201(c)(2) subsequent to Singleton I, may be the
expedient and simple resolution to arguments based on the Singleton
I holding, but in this case that answer is neither a reasonable interpre-
tation of the statute nor an adequate means of maintaining a fair and
effective criminal justice system.
A fair and effective criminal justice system is one that affords
prosecutors sufficient powers to obtain criminal convictions while
preserving for defendants the rights necessary for a just trial. Reading
a government exception into subsection 201(c)(2), as did the Single-
ton II court, is not an adequate resolution of the issue because that in-
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
8. See id. § 201(c)(2).
9. As the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in Singleton II, this interpretation is
unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. See United States v. Singleton, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999)
(denying certiorari).
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terpretation sacrifices the protections the gratuity statute affords to
criminal defendants and expands the powers of federal prosecutors.
Under the Singleton II interpretation, federal prosecutors are not
limited by subsection 201(c)(2), and thus they are not limited in what
they may offer potential witnesses to induce them to testify. This
gives federal prosecutors unfair bargaining power over defendants,
who are constrained by subsection 201(c)(2). Reading the gratuity
statute as wholly prohibiting federal prosecutors from exchanging
plea agreements with criminal defendants for testimony, as the Sin-
gleton I court did, is also unsatisfactory, given how deeply ingrained
plea bargaining is in our criminal justice system and how severely its
banishment would hamper the ability of prosecutors to obtain crimi-
nal convictions against co-defendants. Prohibition of all plea bargains
would protect the interests of criminal defendants by reducing the
chance that co-defendants would be induced by plea agreements to
testify falsely against them, but this reading of subsection 201(c)(2)
would make it very difficult for the criminal justice system to func-
tion.
There is, however, an alternative to forcing subsection 201(c)(2)
into either the Singleton I or the Singleton II interpretation—a solu-
tion that balances the interest of criminal defendants in receiving a
fair trial and the interest of the government in maintaining an effec-
tive criminal justice system. The solution to this semantic nightmare is
to repeal subsection 201(c)(2) altogether, allowing prosecutors and
defendants alike to exchange consideration for testimony and re-
quiring only that both sides fully disclose any such arrangement to the
jury.10 Subsection 201(b), the bribery statute, would continue to pro-
hibit offers and deals made with intent to influence the content of a
witness’s testimony, but attorneys on both sides of the aisle would be
free to offer consideration to encourage reluctant witnesses to testify.
Since federal prosecutors are currently required to disclose the details
of the plea agreements that they offer in exchange for testimony, this
new rule would afford defense attorneys the same opportunity to en-
courage reluctant witnesses to testify, provided that they, too, met the
disclosure requirements. Of course, a defense attorney, unlike a
prosecutor, could not offer leniency or a reduced sentence in ex-
10. A companion to the gratuity statute criminalizes accepting anything of value offered
for, or because of, testimony under oath or affirmation. See 18 U.S. § 201(c)(3). The discussion
of § 201(c)(2) herein applies equally to § 201(c)(3). However, since only § 201(c)(2) has come
under fire and debate, that is the focus of this Note. Repealing § 201(c)(2) would not accomplish
the objectives sought if § 201(c)(3) were not also repealed.
EWING (LATEST VERSION).DOC 09/21/00 1:01 PM
1374 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1371
change for testimony as could a prosecutor, but the defense attorney
could offer other incentives to witnesses who otherwise might be un-
willing to testify. Full disclosure of consideration paid in exchange for
a witness’s testimony would leave to the jury the determination of
whether the agreement affected the content of a particular witness’s
testimony. Repealing subsection 201(c)(2) and replacing it with this
disclosure rule is the only fair answer to the dichotomous and unsatis-
factory interpretations of the federal gratuity statute offered in Sin-
gleton I and Singleton II.
This Note considers both Singleton decisions and the various in-
terpretations of subsection 201(c)(2) offered in those cases and their
progeny. It proposes that repealing subsection 201(c)(2) is the most
reasonable way both to resolve the conflicting interpretations of the
statute and to maximize the fairness and effectiveness of the criminal
justice system. Part I of this Note reviews the origins and develop-
ment of the explosive debate over the proper interpretation of sub-
section 201(c)(2) in the federal judiciary. Part II analyzes the plain
meaning and legislative history of subsection 201(c) both independ-
ently and as discussed in federal case law. Part III evaluates the com-
peting judicial interpretations of subsection 201(c)(2), comparing the
strongest arguments for and against excluding the government and its
agents from the reach of the gratuity statute. Part IV considers the
failure of these competing judicial interpretations to address or re-
dress the fundamental imbalance created by allowing prosecutors, but
not defendants, to make deals with potential witnesses to encourage
testimony. Part IV then proposes the repeal of subsection 201(c)(2) in
favor of a rule that allows federal prosecutors and defendants alike to
exchange consideration for testimony provided that such arrange-
ments are disclosed to the jury.
I.  UNITED STATES V. SINGLETON: THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE
An investigation of a conspiracy to launder drug money and to
distribute cocaine culminated in the arrest of Sonya Evette Singleton,
Napoleon Douglas, and several other individuals.11 Douglas entered
into a plea agreement with the government, promising to testify
against Singleton and other defendants in return for promises by the
government (1) not to prosecute Douglas for any other criminal acts
related to the narcotics investigation, (2) to inform the court of the
11. See Singleton I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343-44 (10th Cir. 1998).
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nature and extent of Douglas’s cooperation, and (3) to advise the
state parole board of the nature and extent of Douglas’s coopera-
tion.12
Singleton challenged the admissibility of Douglas’s testimony,
alleging that the plea bargain federal prosecutors had offered Doug-
las violated the federal gratuity statute.13 The trial court overruled
Singleton’s objection, allowing Douglas to testify, and Singleton was
convicted.14 Singleton appealed, alleging that admission of Douglas’s
testimony was reversible error.15
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed Sin-
gleton’s appeal and, in a detailed opinion written by Judge Kelly, con-
sidered four possible reasons for excluding federal prosecutors from
the federal gratuity statute. The court rejected each reason, conclud-
ing that none justified excluding the government from the broad lan-
guage of subsection 201(c)(2). Thus, the Singleton I court held that
federal prosecutors violate the federal gratuity statute when they plea
bargain with witnesses to induce them to testify.16 The unanimous
Tenth Circuit panel reversed Singleton’s conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial, in which Douglas’s illegally obtained testi-
mony would be excluded.17
The Singleton I decision had quick and widespread aftershocks.18
Although a few courts supported the decision,19 most did
12. See id. at 1344.
13. See id. at 1343.
14. See id. at 1343-44.
15. See id. at 1343.
16. See id. at 1344-58.
17. See id. at 1361.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521, 521-22 (D. Md. 1998) (calling
the Singleton I opinion “amazingly unsound, not to mention nonsensical” and offering that
“[t]he chances of either or both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court reaching the same
conclusion as the Singleton panel are, in this Court’s judgment, about the same as discovering
that the entire roster of the Baltimore Orioles consists of cleverly disguised leprechauns”);
United States v. Duncan, No. Crim.A. 97-217, 1998 WL 419503, at *1 (E.D. La. July 15, 1998)
(denying a motion for a new trial based on the Singleton I opinion).
19. See United States v. Revis, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1249 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (agreeing with
Singleton I’s statutory interpretation of § 201(c), although ultimately holding that specific provi-
sions of § 5K1.1, the section of the federal sentencing guidelines authorizing a downward depar-
ture in sentencing where the defendant has provided substantial assistance to the government,
allowed the instant plea bargain in exchange for testimony); United States v. Fraguela, No.
Crim.A. 96-0339, 1998 WL 560352, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1998) (granting defendant’s motion
for a new trial on the ground that “the testimony of several pivotal witnesses against him was
procured in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)”), vacated on other grounds, No. Crim.A. 96-339,
1998 WL 910219, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1998); United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348,
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not.20 In fact, only two district courts have followed the decision in
Singleton I, and one of those has been reversed on appeal.21 On Janu-
ary 8, 1999, the Tenth Circuit itself issued an en banc opinion in Sin-
gleton II, reversing the short-lived holding in Singleton I.22 Yet, the
reasoning in Singleton I, which gave credibility to reading subsection
201(c)(2) as applying to agents of the federal government, has since
been used frequently by defendants in both federal and state courts.23
None of the courts that have considered arguments similar to the rea-
soning in Singleton I have satisfactorily dispelled the Singleton I
analysis.24
Most of the federal courts that have evaluated whether subsec-
tion 201(c)(2) applies to plea bargaining in the aftermath of Singleton
I have provided little or no legal analysis of the issue. Instead, these
courts have either cited the reasoning offered in earlier court opinions
that had rejected the analysis of Singleton I or declined to follow Sin-
1350 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (granting a motion to suppress the anticipated testimony of three co-
defendants because “the plea agreements . . . violate the clear and unambiguous meaning of sec-
tion 201(c)(2)”), rev’d, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 212 (1999).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209-10 (D.N.J. 1998) (collecting
cases). Many courts have refused to consider motions premised on the Singleton I holding on
the ground that the decision was vacated and cannot serve as a legal foundation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carroll, Nos. 97-4022, 97-4259, 1998 WL 801880, at *3 n.4 (4th Cir. Nov. 19,
1998); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 482 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Romero, No.
97CR.650 (LMM), 1998 WL 788799, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1998); United States v. Buck-
ley, No. 98-40026-02-RDR, 1998 WL 774634, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 7, 1998); United States v.
Rucker, No. 98-40071-01-RDR, 1998 WL 682252, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 18, 1998); United States
v. Polidoro, No. CIV.A. 97-383-02, 1998 WL 634921, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1998); United
States v. Durham, No. 98-10051-02, 1998 WL 684241, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 1998); United
States v. Garcia, No. CRIM.3:97CR48 (AHN), 1998 WL 744102, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn. Sept. 9,
1998); United States v. Allen, Nos. CRIM.A. 93-36-1, 97-CV-4698, 1998 WL 575264, at *4 n.8
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 1998); United States v. McGuire, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1266 (D. Kan. 1998);
United States v. Pungitore, 15 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1998); United States v. Duncan,
No. Crim.A 97-217, 1998 WL 419503, at *1 (E.D. La. July 15, 1998).
21. See Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1348, rev’d, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 212 (1999); Fraguela, No. CRIM.A. 96-0339, 1998 WL 560352, at *1, vacated on other
grounds, 1998 WL 910219 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1998).
22. See 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Miles, No. 98-3202, 2000 WL 121281, at *4 (10th Cir. Feb. 1,
2000); United States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329, 341 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bidloff, No.
97-CR-233A, 2000 WL 122337, at *5-*13 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000); State v. Coleman, Nos.
99AP-139, 99-AP-140, 2000 WL 38359, at *2-*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2000); State v. Warfield,
No. 18111-1-III, 2000 WL 85327, at *7-*8 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2000).
24. For a discussion of the necessity of a legislative, rather than judicial, remedy to the am-
biguity in § 201(c)(2), see infra Part IV.
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gleton I because it did not comport with longstanding common law
and practice.25
To understand the conflict between the Singleton I and Singleton
II cases and their progeny, one must consider principles of statutory
construction, public policy, and judicial precedent. We begin with an
examination of the statute’s text and legislative history.26
25. See United States v. Masciandaro, No. CR.305 (SHS), 1998 WL 814637, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 19, 1998) (denying a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal because (1) “[t]he long
standing practice of promising leniency to cooperating accomplices who agree to testify has
been consistently recognized and judicially approved” (citations omitted); (2) “[n]umerous stat-
utes enacted by Congress implicitly reveal its approval of the practice” (citations omitted); and
(3) “nearly every district court that has considered the present issue has rejected the Singleton
[I] court’s analysis” (citing United States v. Meija, No. 8 CR.4 (JGK), 1998 WL 598098, at *1
(S.D.N.Y Sept. 8, 1998))); United States v. Moore, No. 97C17181, 1998 WL 778073, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 2, 1998) (finding Singleton I “unhelpful” because “[n]o other jurisdiction has adopted
its holding” and “the reasoning of Singleton [I] . . . is contrary to the Seventh Circuit decision of
United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1975), a fact the Tenth Circuit acknowledged”);
Nero v. United States, Nos. CIV.A. 97-2721, CRIM. 91-321-02, 1998 WL 744031, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 23, 1998) (citing other recent district court cases and holding that “the short answer is that
the promise or prospect of a § 5K1.1 motion in return for testimony which the government
deems to be truthful and of substantial assistance does not violate the bribery statute or other-
wise entitle defendant to set aside his conviction or sentence”); United States v. Nieves, No.
3:97CA238 (AHN), 1998 WL 740835, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 13, 1998) (citing the historical com-
mon law argument of United States v. Barbaro, No. 98CR.412 (JFK), 1998 WL 556152, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1998), that the practice of offering leniency in exchange for cooperation
originated with English common law and has been recognized in the United States since that
time, as well as the argument that the government, if not specifically included in the scope of a
statute, is deemed excluded); United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518, 535 (M.D. Pa. 1998)
(citing the legislative history of § 201 and other district court cases disagreeing with Singleton I
as well as finding that that decision was “an extreme and radical departure from history, prac-
tice, and established law[,] . . . mak[ing] a criminal out of nearly every federal prosecutor—and
accomplices out of district judges . . . [and] suppress[ing] highly relevant evidence and
crippl[ing] enforcement of federal criminal law”); United States v. Laureano, No. 97CR.0741
(HB), 1998 WL 696006, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998) (citing Barbaro, 1998 WL 556152, at *3;
Szur, 1998 WL 661484, at *1; United States v. Arana, No. 95-CR-80272, 1998 WL 420673 (E.D.
Mich. July 24, 1998); Guillaume, 1998 WL 462199); United States v. Gabourel, 9 F. Supp. 2d
1246, 1247 (D. Colo. 1998) (adopting the reasoning in United States v. Dunlap, 17 F. Supp. 2d
1183 (D. Colo. 1998)); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521, 521 (D. Md. 1998).
26. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (stressing that the Court “begin[s] as [it] do[es] in any exercise of
statutory construction with the text of the provision in question, and move[s] on, as need be, to
the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs”); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) (“As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret
the words of these statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.”).
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II.  THE LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. §
201(C)(2)
Subsection 201(c)(2) was enacted in substantially its current form
over thirty-five years ago.27 Yet, no conflict regarding the scope of the
statute and no body of judicial interpretation of subsection 201(c)(2)
existed until Singleton I. To ascertain the meaning and proper appli-
cation of the statute, one must first examine its text, considering also
the intent of the Congress that crafted the law more than three dec-
ades ago.
A. The Language and Plain Meaning of Subsection 201(c)(2)
Section 201 is divided into two sections, one that prohibits brib-
ery and the other gratuity.28 Subsection 201(b), the bribery provision,
makes it illegal to offer something of value to a public official or to a
witness with intent to corrupt that witness’s testimony. Subsection
201(c)(2), the gratuity provision, is similar to subsection 201(b), but it
does not require that an offender intend to corrupt the testimony of
the witness. Subsection 201(c)(2) provides:
Whoever . . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything
of value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or
affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, any committee
of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, com-
mission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to
hear evidence or take testimony, or for or because of such person’s
absence therefrom; . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
for not more than two years, or both.29
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, when interpreting a
statute, the clear and plain meaning of the text should be controlling
unless there is an ambiguity that requires examination of the statute’s
legislative history for clarification.30 On its face, the language of sub-
27. See Pub. L. No. 87-849, § 1(a), 76 Stat. 1119 (1962).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)–(c) (1994).
29. Id. § 201(c)(2).
30. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) (“Only the most extraordinary
showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from [plain] lan-
guage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Over 150 years ago, the Supreme Court stated this
principle clearly:
[W]here the words of a law, treaty, or contract, have a plain and obvious meaning, all
construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded. This is a maxim of law, and a
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section 201(c)(2) seems to apply to the government and its agents and
therefore to proscribe government officials from exchanging plea
bargains for testimony.31 Subsection 201(c)(2) uses the word “who-
ever,” one of the most inclusive terms Congress could have used in
establishing the set of entities to which the statute applies.
In Singleton II, however, Judge Porfilio, writing for the majority,
found that the dictionary definition of “whoever” does not include
the government.32 Judge Porfilio asserted that, under its “common
meaning,” the term “whoever” refers to people.33 Judge Porfilio rea-
soned that the legislature would have used the impersonal “what-
ever,” in addition to “whoever,” if it had meant to include the gov-
ernment and other entities within the gratuity statute.34 Since
Congress used only “whoever,” the Singleton II court found that
“construing ‘whoever’ to include the government [would be] semanti-
cally anomalous.”35 Finding that the United States as an entity in-
cludes the federal prosecutors who act as its voice in federal courts,
the court further held that federal prosecutors are not included in the
definition of “whoever” in subsection 201(c)(2).36
The Singleton II majority’s restrictive interpretation of “who-
ever” was not satisfactory to all, however, as Judge Kelly, author of
the majority opinion in Singleton I, made clear in a dissenting opin-
ion. In his dissent, Judge Kelly argued that “[t]extually, ‘whoever’
clearly connotes more than a being and in fact denotes inanimate en-
tities. The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, definition of ‘whoever’ in-
cludes, but is not limited to, corporations, companies, associations,
dictate of common sense; for were a different rule to be admitted, no man, however
cautious and intelligent, could safely estimate the extent of his engagements, or rest
upon his own understanding of a law, until a judicial construction of those instru-
ments had been obtained.
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89-90 (1821); accord Holloway v. United States, 119 S. Ct.
966 (1999) (stating that “we typically begin the task of statutory construction by focusing on the
words that the drafters have chosen”).
31. “Whoever” appears to be an inclusive term, which would generally indicate that all
persons and entities capable of so acting are included within its scope. See United States v. Low-
ery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding “whoever” to be a “seemingly unlimited
statutory class”).
32. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299-302 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999).
33. See id. at 1300.
34. See id. (reasoning that “[t]he word ‘whatever’ is used commonly to refer to an inani-
mate object”).
35. Id.
36. See id.
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firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies—all inani-
mate entities.”37
Subsections surrounding 201(c)(2) provide contextual guidance
in determining the proper interpretation of the gratuity statute.38 Per-
haps most important, subsection 201(c) is written as a single sentence
with three subsections, all of which are directed to “whoever,” and all
of which come with one stated punishment of a fine or imprison-
ment.39 Subsection 201(c)(1) provides a limitation upon the word
“whoever”: “otherwise than as provided by law for the proper dis-
charge of official duty.”40
This limitation in subsection 201(c)(1) is noticeably absent from
subsection 201(c)(2), where “whoever” is not limited in any way.
Congress’s explicit exclusion of government officials from subsection
201(c)(1) appears to indicate that it did not intend to exclude gov-
37. Id. at 1310 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
38. The proper meaning of statutory language must be determined by considering the con-
text in which the words are written. See, e.g., Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div.,
Avco Corp. v. UAW, 523 U.S. 653, 657 (1998); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575
(1995); United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
39. The text of section 201 (c) reads as follows:
Whoever—
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty—
(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any
public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public offi-
cial, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by
such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public
official; or
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a
public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge
of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or
agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed by such official or person;
(2) directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of value to any per-
son, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be
given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, be-
fore any court, any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or
any agency, commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States
to hear evidence or take testimony, or for or because of such person’s absence
therefrom;
(3) directly or indirectly, demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive
or accept anything of value personally for or because of the testimony under
oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon any
such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or for or because of such person’s ab-
sence therefrom;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
40. Id. § 201(c)(1).
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ernment officials from subsection 201(c)(2). Even more clearly, sub-
section 201(c)(1)(B) applies only to “a public official, former public
official, or person selected to be a public official.”41 It would be im-
possible for Congress to limit the term “whoever” in subsection
201(c)(1)(B) to include only government officials if the term did not
include government officials in the first place, as the Singleton II court
held. Thus, the context of subsection 201(c)(2) supports a reading of
the gratuity statute that includes government officials within the
scope of “whoever.”
The language of subsection 201(c)(2), examined both in isolation
and in the context of surrounding sections, seems relatively straight-
forward: no one may offer anything of value to any witness in ex-
change for her testimony, except for witness fees and expenses spe-
cifically allowed under subsection 201(d).42 A reasonable reading of
subsection 201(c)(2), given its language and context, indicates that the
statute applies to federal prosecutors because the term “whoever” is
broad enough to include the government and its agents and there is
nothing in the language of subsection 201(c)(2) to limit the applica-
tion of “whoever.”
B. The Legislative History of Subsection 201(c)(2)
Courts generally refuse to consult the legislative history for addi-
tional help in statutory interpretation except in cases such as this,
where the meaning of statutory language is disputed.43 Unfortunately,
the limited legislative history of subsection 201(c)(2) contains little
discussion of the statute’s scope.
41. Id. § 201(c)(1)(B).
42. Section 201(d) establishes limited payments that may be made to or received by wit-
nesses:
Paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) and paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c)
shall not be construed to prohibit the payment or receipt of witness fees provided by
law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and receipt by
a witness, of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable
value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceeding, or in the
case of expert witnesses, a reasonable fee for time spent in the preparation of such
opinion, and in such appearing and testifying.
Id. § 201(d).
43. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1997) (“Only the most extraordinary
showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from that lan-
guage.”).
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Congress enacted section 201 to deter corruption in the govern-
ment and to prevent possible sources of such corruption.44 The statute
as a whole addresses bribery, gratuity, graft, and conflicts of interest
with regard to government employees in all branches.45 In a Senate
Report reacting favorably on the statute, the Committee on the Judi-
ciary recognized the “necessity for maintaining high ethical standards
of behavior in the Government.”46 The statute was intended to assist
in that endeavor by regulating governmental behavior in dealings
with private citizens and business entities.47 Given that the statute, in
general, is directed at government officials and their behavior, one
can reasonably infer that Congress intended subsection 201(c)(2) to
apply to the government as well.
When section 201 was enacted, it replaced several existing brib-
ery statutes with “a single comprehensive section of the Criminal
Code.” 48 Arguing in support of section 201, the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary declared that “[t]his consolidation would make no sig-
nificant changes of substance and, more particularly, would not re-
strict the broad scope of the present bribery statutes as construed by
the courts.”49 Furthermore, in discussing sections 201(h) and (i), the
first of which became subsection 201(c)(2),50 the Senate Report of the
Committee on the Judiciary stated that “[s]ubsections (h) and (i) . . .
forbid offers or payments to, and solicitations or receipt by, a witness
of anything of value ‘for or because of’ testimony given or to be given
by him.”51 This affirmation of the broad applicability of section 201
supports interpreting subsection 201(c)(2) to include plea bargains of-
fered by government officials.
The courts that have examined the scarce legislative history of
section 201 have drawn significant conclusions both from what the
history includes and what it does not.52 The Singleton I court noted “at
44. See S. REP. NO. 87-2213 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3857.
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
46. S. REP. NO. 87-2213, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3853.
47. See id., reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3853-56.
48. Id., reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3852-53.
49. Id., reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3853.
50.  See Singleton I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
51. S. REP. NO. 87-2213 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3857.
52. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Hawaii district court have found that Congress did not
intend the interpretation of § 201(c)(2) reached in Singleton I. See United States v. Haese, 162
F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1795 (1999) (concluding that “Congress did
not intend for section 201(c)(2) to be used when prosecutors offer lenity for a witness’ truthful
testimony”); United States v. Roque-Acosta, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1257 (D. Haw. 1998) (failing
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the outset that § 201 is to be broadly construed to further its legisla-
tive purpose of deterring corruption.”53 Additionally, Singleton I
found that when Congress reorganized the criminal bribery statute
into separate bribery and gratuity provisions, it deleted the scienter
requirement from the gratuity section without limiting the scope of its
application.54 Because the legislative history indicated no intention by
Congress to exclude the government from the prohibition of subsec-
tion 201(c)(2), Singleton I found that the government should be in-
cluded.55
In United States v. Ware,56 the Sixth Circuit also looked to the
legislative history in determining the correct meaning of subsection
201(c)(2).57 Like the court in Singleton I, the Ware court found little
guidance in the limited legislative history on the question of whether
the gratuity statute was intended to apply to the government.58 Unlike
the court in Singleton I, however, the Ware court cited the absence of
legislative history regarding the scope of subsection 201(c)(2) as evi-
dence that the statute does not apply to the government.59 The Ware
court held that “[t]he legislative history is void of any declaration that
[subsection 201(c)(2)] was intended to thwart the long-sanctioned
prosecutorial prerogative” of making plea bargains with defendants in
exchange for testimony.60 The Ware court reasoned that since there
was no specific indication from Congress that it intended to take away
the longstanding authority of prosecutors to exchange plea bargains
for testimony, the statute should not be read to do so.
Unfortunately, the legislative history provides limited guidance
in interpreting the unclear language of subsection 201(c)(2). Courts
have relied on the absence of significant legislative history to argue
both for and against including government officials within the gratuity
statute. Judges on both sides have reasoned that congressional intent
hostile to their positions would have been explicit. Thus, the absence
to find any “indication that Congress intended the statute to criminalize the accepted practice of
providing incentives for testimony”).
53. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1345 (citing United States v. Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1147, 1149
(5th Cir. 1984)).
54. See id. at 1351 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1952)).
55. See id. at 1352.
56. 161 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999).
57. See id. at 423-24.
58. See id. at 423.
59. See id.
60. Id.
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of explicit intent has been used to bolster both inclusion and exclu-
sion of the government from subsection 201(c)(2). Without a single
convincing interpretation of subsection201(c)(2), courts are left to ex-
amine the evidence, to rely on what they find relevant, and to make
independent determinations about the statute’s scope.
III.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND THE NARDONE STANDARD
As discussed above, the scope of subsection 201(c)(2) is not clear
from its text or legislative history. Generally, when examination of
the statutory text and legislative history are inconclusive, the question
of whether a statute applies to the government is examined under the
Supreme Court’s 1937 decision in Nardone v. United States.61 In Nar-
done, the Supreme Court invoked a canon of statutory construction,
based primarily on historical tradition, that a statute is presumed not
to apply to the government unless the language of the statute explic-
itly includes the government.
The Nardone Court identified two classes of cases to which this
canon applies. The first class includes those cases in which applying
the statute to the government “would deprive the sovereign of a rec-
ognized or established prerogative title or interest;” the second is the
class of cases in which applying the statute to government officials
“would work [an] obvious absurdity.”62 Although courts interpreting
subsection 201(c)(2) have not agreed on whether the Nardone canon
applies to cases outside of the two classes specifically addressed by
the Nardone Court,63 all have used the canon and the Nardone Court’s
61. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
62. Id. at 383-84 (citations omitted). The discussion of this canon in the Nardone opinion is
brief and provides little guidance for its application.
63. Singleton I found the fact that the Nardone canon had only been applied in two types of
cases to be a limiting statement. See Singleton I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1345-46 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding
that “[t]he canon applies only to [the] two classes of cases” specifically enumerated in Nardone).
Singleton II and Ware did not dispute this finding of the Singleton I court, but found that §
201(c)(2) fits into both of the classes of cases to which the Nardone Court said the canon ap-
plies. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371
(1999); Ware, 161 F.3d at 420-22 (6th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999). Many other
courts disagreeing with Singleton I also rely on the Nardone canon. See, e.g., United States v.
White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (finding that “[e]ither of these long-recognized
exceptions provides a sufficient basis, in this court’s view, for its conclusion that the sovereign,
and, hence, federal prosecutors, are not prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) from entering into
plea agreements with criminal defendants to procure their testimony in other cases”); United
States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536-37 (E.D. Va. 1998) (discussing the rule of Nardone as a
“canon of statutory construction” and stating that the rule applies to these two types of cases);
United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (applying the same Nardone
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discussion of it in determining whether the word “whoever” in sub-
section 201(c)(2) includes the government.64
A. Established Right of the Sovereign
The first category of cases to which the Nardone canon applies
includes those in which application of a statute to the government
would impair an established right of the sovereign.65 The government
is generally not bound by a statute that “tends to restrain or diminish
[its] powers, rights, or interests,” unless the statute explicitly applies
to the government.66
In applying this first principle from Nardone, several courts have
found that “[t]he prosecutorial prerogative to recommend leniency in
exchange for testimony dates back to the common law in England
and has been recognized and approved by Congress, the courts, and
the Sentencing Commission of the United States.”67 In supporting this
finding, the courts have generally relied on the Supreme Court’s late
nineteenth-century decision in The Whiskey Cases.68 In The Whiskey
Cases, the Court found that an accomplice cooperating as a witness
should have the opportunity to request a pardon from the court and
could expect the prosecutor to make a favorable recommendation to
canon but arguing that “[n]othing in that decision or any other Supreme Court decision ‘limits’
application of the canon to only the two classes of cases mentioned”).
64. Although the Nardone canon has been used in the interpretation of § 201(c)(2), the
canon has not been cited or applied often since the Nardone decision was handed down in 1937.
According to Westlaw, Nardone has been cited in approximately 260 cases since it was decided
in 1937, and more than thirty of those have been since Singleton I. Search of Westlaw,
ALLCASES and ALLCASES-OLD databases (Aug. 25, 2000). Very few of the cases citing
Nardone before Singleton I cited the case for its rule that statutes do not apply to the sovereign
unless they do so explicitly. See, e.g., Shaw v. Library of Congress, 747 F.2d 1469, 1477 (D.C. Cir.
1984); National Association of Letter Carriers v. U.S. Postal Service, 333 F. Supp. 566, 570
(D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Mayo, 47 F. Supp. 552, 556 (N.D. Fla. 1942).
65. See Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383.
66. United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 251, 255 (1873); accord The Dollar Savs.
Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1873) (“It is a familiar principle that the King
is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be named therein by special and particular
words.”); Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1302 (speculating that “if Congress had intended that section
201(c)(2) overturn this ingrained aspect of American legal culture, it would have done so in
clear, unmistakable, and unarguable language”).
67. Ware, 161 F.3d at 419 (citing The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 594, 604 (1878)); ac-
cord Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227 (1941); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 333-
37 (1892); The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) at 599-600); Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1301 (citing
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310-12 (1966)).
68. 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 594 (1878).
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the court on the accomplice’s behalf.69 In addition, The Whiskey Cases
discussed the long-established English common law principle on
which this expectation was based.70 Relying on both the holding and
the reasoning of The Whiskey Cases, several courts have found that
there is an established government right to plea bargain with criminal
defendants and that a statute should not be read to limit that right
unless the statute expressly applies to the government.71
Although The Whiskey Cases did recognize a historical tradition
of defendants cooperating with prosecutors in hopes of receiving fa-
vorable treatment, The Whiskey Cases do not actually establish that
prosecutors may directly exchange leniency for testimony. Instead,
The Whiskey Cases indicates that a cooperating defendant has the
right to seek a pardon or leniency and that the defendant should ex-
pect that his cooperation in the prosecution will justify receiving it. In
the contemporary legal system this relationship is reflected in the
Sentencing Guidelines, which enable trial courts to consider whether
a defendant-witness has provided “substantial assistance” in a crimi-
nal prosecution sufficient to justify reducing her sentence.72 The Sen-
tencing Guidelines do not require that a cooperating defendant’s
“substantial assistance” be predicated on a promise or agreement
with the prosecution; instead, there is a general expectation that assis-
tance provided voluntarily by a defendant will be considered favora-
bly by the court even in the absence of such an agreement.
Lower federal courts have argued that the Supreme Court has
validated the propriety of agreements similar to the one at issue in the
Singleton cases.73 In the cases commonly cited for this proposition, the
Supreme Court implicitly accepted the validity of testimony obtained
through plea bargaining by admitting such testimony as evidence.74
69. See id. at 604. The district courts that have reached this conclusion have also relied on
The Whiskey Cases. See, e.g., United States v. Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (D.N.J. 1998);
United States v. Barbaro, No. 98 CR. 412 (JFK), 1998 WL 556152, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1,
1998); United States v. Juncal, No. 98 CR. 1162 (JFK), 1998 WL 525800, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
20, 1998); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 (E.D. Va. 1998).
70. See The Whiskey Cases, (9 Otto) 99 U.S. at 599-605.
71. See United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ram-
sey, 165 F.3d 980, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Ware, 161 F.3d at 419.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Hunte, No. 97-1987, 1999 WL 649627, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 26,
1999); Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 988; Ware, 161 F.3d at 420.
74. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 674-79 (1986) (finding that, for purposes of
challenging credibility, the defendant was entitled to cross-examine a witness about an alleged
agreement reached between the witness and the prosecutor without directly considering the va-
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The parties in these cases, however, did not question, and the Court
did not directly consider, whether those plea agreements were valid.75
In Brady v. United States,76 for example, the defendant argued
that the plea agreement he reached with the government was involun-
tary and therefore invalid.77 The Supreme Court held that Brady’s
plea was voluntary, finding that it might have been motivated by the
recognition that pleading guilty would result in a lesser sentence un-
der the statute than the defendant would risk at trial, where his co-
defendant, who had already entered a plea agreement with the prose-
cution, might testify against him.78 Although the Brady Court ac-
knowledged that the co-defendant could testify against Brady, the
Court did not discuss the circumstances under which the co-
defendant’s testimony became available.79 Still, the Court’s acknowl-
edgment of the co-defendant as a potential witness, without ques-
tioning the validity of the plea agreement that made him available to
testify, provides at least implicit approval of such agreements. Relying
on cases such as Brady and on the common law tradition of exchang-
ing plea bargains for testimony,80 the Ware court found that inter-
lidity of the agreement between the prosecutor and the witness); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (holding that any evidence of an understanding between the prosecution
and the co-defendant must be disclosed because it could affect the credibility of the witness, but
not examining directly whether the prosecution had the authority to enter into such an agree-
ment); see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1980) (finding that every citizen
has a common law and statutory responsibility to participate in the enforcement of the law, re-
gardless of whether that person faces criminal conspiracy charges).
75. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 674-79; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55.
76. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
77. See id. at 743.
78. See id. at 758.
79. The only mention of testimony in the case is a reference to Brady’s co-defendant who,
having entered a guilty plea, was “available to testify” against Brady. Id. at 743.
80. The circuit court opinions cited by United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999), support the longstanding existence of a government
right to plea bargain with defendants in exchange for testimony. See United States v. Cervantes-
Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 956 (10th Cir.
1987); United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 196 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Long ago the courts rejected
the notion that the testimony of co-defendants and other interested witnesses was so likely to be
unreliable that it should be excluded.”); United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983);
United States v. McCallie, 554 F.2d 770, 772 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d
1091, 1102 (7th Cir. 1974) (“If the government can excuse criminal or civil liability in settling a
criminal case, surely it can use that power of compromise to obtain guilty pleas or to procure
testimony in other proceedings.”). Courts have also found judicial precedent persuasive in their
arguments for a government exception to § 201(c)(2). See United States v. Abraham, 29 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 212 (D.N.J. 1998) (“[E]very federal court of appeals with jurisdiction over crimi-
nal cases has allowed testimony by cooperating witnesses in return for sentencing or financial
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preting the gratuity statute to prohibit such agreements would take
away an established right of the sovereign.81 Since the Nardone canon
permits statutory limitation of established sovereign rights only by
statutes that explicitly apply to the government,82 the courts have
found that subsection 201(c)(2) implicitly excludes the government.
The Singleton I court found that subsection 201(c)(2) applies to
the government regardless of whether exchanging plea bargains for
testimony is an established prosecutorial prerogative. In reaching this
conclusion, the Singleton I court relied on two exceptions that the
Nardone Court established regarding its rule that statutes should not
be interpreted as limiting established rights of the sovereign.83 First,
Nardone indicates that a statute that does not limit established rights
of the government itself might still apply to limit the actions of gov-
ernment agents.84 Second, Nardone says that the canon of governmen-
tal exclusion from statutes that would infringe on established sover-
eign rights does not exclude the government from statutes intended to
prevent public injury or wrongdoing.85
Singleton I found that subsection 201(c)(2) fits within the first ex-
ception to the Nardone canon because it applies to prosecutors rather
than to the government itself, limiting the “way in which [those]
agent[s] carr[y] out the government’s interests.”86 The court reasoned
that the gratuity statute does not prevent the government from
charging, trying, and punishing criminals; it only serves to limit the
means government agents may employ in doing so.
Singleton I also found that subsection 201(c)(2) falls under the
second exception to the Nardone canon and thus should apply to the
government as well as to government agents, because the statute’s
“purpose is to prevent fraud, injury, or wrong.”87 The Singleton I court
also determined that subsection 201(c)(2) meets the second exception
considerations.”); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“[T]here is an
endless number of federal cases among the Circuits in favor of plea agreements.”).
81. See Ware, 161 F.3d at 421.
82. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937).
83. See Singleton I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1998).
84. See Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383 (“The rule of exclusion of the sovereign is less stringently
applied where the operation of the law is upon the agents or servants of the government rather
than on the sovereign itself.”).
85. See id. at 384 (“[T]he sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute intended to
prevent injury and wrong.”).
86. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1346.
87. Id. at 1346 (citing Nardone, 302 U.S. at 384; United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
251, 255-56 (1873)).
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to the Nardone canon because “[t]he anti-gratuity provision . . . indi-
cates Congress’s belief that justice is undermined by giving, offering,
or promising anything of value for testimony.”88 The court noted that
the legislative history of subsection 201(c)(2) showed a concern with
just such corruption.89 As a result, Singleton I found that the Nardone
canon does not work to exclude the government from subsection
201(c)(2).90
Whether the government has an established right to exchange of-
fers of leniency for testimony from criminal defendants, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the practice in the course of several deci-
sions and has not condemned such agreements. It is unclear whether
this indirect precedent is sufficient to show an established govern-
ment right under Nardone, but it does provide some basis for the ar-
gument. As the Singleton I court demonstrated, however, strong ar-
guments can be made that subsection 201(c)(2) falls within one or
both of the exceptions to the first class of cases covered by the Nar-
done canon, suggesting that the government and its agents should be
included under the statute.
B. Inclusion Works an Absurdity
Even if common law tradition and arguably supportive case law
do not establish a right of the government or its officers to exchange
plea bargains for testimony, many courts considering the issue have
found that including the government within the scope of subsection
201(c)(2) is not permissible because inclusion would work an obvious
absurdity, the second category to which the Nardone canon applies.91
88. Id.
89. See supra Part II.B.
90. See Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1346 (“Because § 201(c)(2) addresses what Congress per-
ceived to be a wrong, and operates to prevent fraud upon the federal courts in the form of in-
herently unreliable testimony, the proscription of § 201(c)(2) must apply to the government.”);
see also United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“Even assuming
that the Executive Branch has a recognized or established interest in securing the cooperation
of defendants, the Executive Branch cannot establish that Section 201(c)(2) operates on the Ex-
ecutive Branch, as opposed to individual federal officers.”).
91. See United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348
(1999); United States v. Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d 206, 211 (D.N.J. 1998) (“[A] reading of §
201(c)(2) as given by the Singleton panel would lead to absurd results . . . . Courts may ignore
the plain meaning of the words of the statute in order to avoid the absurd result that would fol-
low the prohibition of all such testimony in criminal and civil enforcement cases.”); United
States v. White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (“[A]pplying § 201(c)(2) to government
plea agreements entered to procure future testimony would ‘work obvious absurdity’ because
without such testimony, the government would be unable to . . . effectively proceed in the thou-
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A classic example of this second class of cases is speed limits. Re-
quiring police officers in pursuit of fleeing suspects or rushing to the
scene of a crime to abide by speed limits would be an absurd impedi-
ment to the carrying out of their official responsibilities.
Singleton II found that it would be “absurd” to believe that Con-
gress “intended to subject the United States to the provisions of §
201(c)(2), and, consequently, like any other violator, to criminal
prosecution.”92 In contrast, Singleton I found that in a law-abiding so-
ciety, government officials are subject to the same laws as general
citizens.93 Because the creation and limits of government authority
have always been established by written law, the Singleton I court
found that “the statute’s application to government officials, far from
being absurd, is at the center of our legal tradition.”94
In addition to this general argument over whether subsection
201(c)(2) should fall into the second class of cases subject to the Nar-
done canon, some courts have held that conflicts between the Single-
ton I reading of the gratuity statute and other federal provisions—the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, and the federal immunity statute—reveal the absurdity of
interpreting subsection 201(c)(2) as prohibiting government officials
from making plea bargains in exchange for testimony.95 These laws
sands of cases each year in which it relies on witnesses who testify in return for leniency.”
(quoting Nardone, 302 U.S. at 384)); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Va.
1998) (“[P]rohibit[ing] prosecutors from making promises in exchange for testimony works an
‘absurd’ result where crimes go unresolved because of worries about testimony that may be
questionable, even though the system already has built-in safeguards concerning questionable
testimony by interested witnesses.”); United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (“[T]his case fits squarely within the second class of cases [of Nardone]—construing
Section 201(c)(2) as argued by Defendants would create an absurdity if applied to federal
prosecutors in their negotiation and execution of plea agreements.”).
92. Singleton II, 165 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999).
93. See Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1347.
94. Id. at 1347-48.
95. See Ware, 161 F.3d at 421-22 (“To apply § 201(c)(2) to the government . . . works the
further absurdity of making criminal that which is explicitly permitted pursuant to the United
States Code as well as the Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Roque-Acosta, 28 F. Supp.
2d 1256, 1257 (D. Haw. 1998) (finding the inclusive interpretation of § 201(c)(2) to be in conflict
with both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994), a Sentencing Guideline authorizing sentence reductions in
exchange for “substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person,” and
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1994), statutes allowing grants of immunity to witnesses in exchange for
testimony); Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (holding that Singleton I’s interpretation of §
201(c)(2) conflicts with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and Federal Rule of Evidence
410 (both of which allow plea bargaining), the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which authorizes
reduced sentencing in exchange for cooperation and assistance, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1994), and
18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1), the Witness Relocation and Protection Act, which authorizes payment
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and rules have been interpreted by some courts as permitting or en-
couraging federal prosecutors to plea bargain with defendants in ex-
change for truthful testimony. Courts that have interpreted the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, and the federal immunity statute as condoning the power
of federal prosecutors to plea bargain have held that interpreting sub-
section 201(c)(2) in a way that would prohibit these agreements
would create the absurdity of criminalizing actions that other rules
and laws authorize.
Authority for federal prosecutors to exchange leniency for truth-
ful testimony can be found in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Rule 11 sets forth the guidelines for criminal pleas,
and subsection 11(e) specifically addresses the procedure for making
a plea agreement.96 Under Rule 11(e)(1), an agreement may be made
between a prosecutor and a defendant where the defendant agrees to
enter “a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense, or to a
lesser or related offense,” and the prosecutor promises to afford leni-
ency to the defendant in return.97 Because defendants must enter their
pleas in open court, pleas may be considered testimony. Thus, a
prosecutor making a plea agreement may be said to have exchanged
leniency for the defendant’s testimony. By this reasoning, a plea
agreement expressly permitted under Rule 11(e) would violate the
Singleton I interpretation of subsection 201(c)(2).
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines can also be read as author-
izing prosecutors to enter into plea bargains in exchange for testi-
of living and housing expenses to witnesses in exchange for testimony); United States v. Dunlap,
17 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1185-87 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding that the broader Singleton I interpretation
would conflict with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e), 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1994), 18
U.S.C. §§ 6001-05, and 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1)-(d)(1)(A)); United States v. Guillaume, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), 28 U.S.C. §
994(n) (1994), a Sentencing Guideline instruction to ensure that substantial assistance would
result in a reduced sentence, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), which provides for re-
ductions after sentencing to reflect assistance subsequent to sentence imposition, U.S.S.G. §
5K1.1, which provides for downward departures from the sentencing guidelines if the defendant
provided reliable and helpful testimony, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05); Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d at
718-19 (finding conflicts with 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1).
96. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
97. Id. Under Rule 11(e)(1), the prosecutor may: (1) move to dismiss other charges against
the defendant; (2) make a sentencing recommendation or agree not to oppose the defendant’s
sentencing request; or (3) agree with the defendant on the appropriate sentence. See id.
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mony.98 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), a trial court may impose a sen-
tence less than prescribed in the Sentencing Guidelines to “reflect a
defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense.”99 Some courts have
interpreted “substantial assistance” to include testifying against an-
other criminal defendant and have thus found that subsections
3553(e) and 201(c)(2) would directly conflict if the gratuity statute
were applied to the government.100 In addition, section 994 of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act directs the Sentencing Commission to set sen-
tence guidelines that “reflect the general appropriateness of imposing
a lower sentence . . . to take into account a defendant’s substantial as-
sistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense.”101 Again, some courts have found that apply-
ing subsection 201(c)(2) to the government would conflict with this
statute, indicating the absurdity of this interpretation of the gratuity
statute.102
Finally, many courts have found that the federal immunity stat-
ute,103 which authorizes federal prosecutors to make agreements with
defendants, would be invalid under the Singleton I interpretation of
subsection 201(c)(2).104 The federal immunity statute allows prosecu-
tors to offer immunity to witnesses in order to induce them to testify
in criminal proceedings. Courts have found that this explicit authori-
zation of exchanging leniency for testimony conflicts with Singleton
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994); Ware, 161 F.3d at 421-22; Roque-Acosta, 28 F. Supp. 2d
at 1257-58; Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 718-19; Dunlap, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1186-87; Guillaume, 13 F.
Supp. 2d at 1333-34.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
100. See Roque-Acosta, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1257; Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 718-19; Dunlap, 17
F. Supp. 2d at 1186-87; Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1333-34.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994).
102. See Ware, 161 F.3d at 422 (“To apply § 201(c)(2) to the government . . . works the fur-
ther absurdity of making criminal that which is explicitly permitted pursuant to other sections of
the United States Code . . . .”); Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1333-34 (“[T]he application of
§201(c)(3) to the government would . . . necessitate the bizarre conclusion that federal prosecu-
tors routinely violate the law by promising to move to reduce the sentences of defendants in ex-
change for their testimony.”).
103. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1994).
104. See Ware, 161 F.3d at 422; United States v. Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213 (D.N.J.
1998); Roque-Acosta, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1257; Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 718; Dunlap, 17 F. Supp.
2d at 1187; Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
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I’s reading of subsection 201(c)(2).105 As the Sixth Circuit reasoned,
“there is no purpose for a grant of immunity to a witness except to
obtain his testimony. And certainly immunity from prosecution is
‘[s]omething of value’ given ‘for or because of the testimony under
oath or affirmation.’”106
The Singleton I court considered whether interpreting subsection
201(c)(2) to include the government or its officers would work an ab-
surdity by creating conflicts with other statutes and rules that author-
ize federal prosecutors to enter into plea agreements in exchange for
testimony.107 Although it did not address Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(e), the Singleton I court did conclude that applying sub-
section 201(c)(2) to the government and its agents would not conflict
with the Sentencing Guidelines or with the federal immunity stat-
ute.108
The Singleton I court found no conflict between the Sentencing
Guidelines and a broad interpretation of subsection 201(c)(2) because
“substantial assistance” under the Sentencing Guidelines includes
“myriad ways other than by testifying” that a defendant may assist the
prosecution and be entitled to a downward departure under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines.109 The Singleton I court concluded that the only
limit subsection 201(c)(2) placed on a prosecutor’s authority to offer
leniency for assistance in the prosecution is that “it simply may not at-
tach any promise, offer, or gift to [a witness’s] testimony.”110 Addi-
tionally, according to the Singleton I court, a downward departure is
only available after substantial assistance has been given; leniency
cannot be part of a deal made between the prosecution and the wit-
ness before the witness testifies.111
The Singleton I court did not find a conflict between its broad
reading of subsection 201(c)(2) and the federal immunity statute, be-
cause, according to the court, the two statutes can “operate fully and
105. See Ware, 161 F.3d at 422; Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 213; Roque-Acosta, 28 F. Supp.
2d at 1257; Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 718; Dunlap, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1187; Guillaume, 13 F. Supp.
2d at 1334.
106. Ware, 161 F.3d at 422 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994)).
107. See Singleton I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1354-56 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297
(10th Cir. 1999).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 1355.
110. Id.
111. See id.
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independently.”112 A court may grant immunity to compel a witness to
testify when that witness has refused to do so, but federal prosecutors
may not promise immunity to a witness to encourage the witness to
testify. The Singleton I court found that “the government does not
give immunity directly for the witness’s testimony; the government
may move the court to grant immunity, which in turn removes the
witness’s testimonial [Fifth Amendment] privilege so the ordinary
compulsion may be brought to bear to require the witness to tes-
tify.”113 The Singleton I court found that its inclusive reading of sub-
section 201(c)(2) did not conflict with the federal immunity statute,
because the power to grant immunity belongs to the court, not to the
prosecutor, and because the federal immunity statute contemplates
that courts will use immunity not as a bargaining chip to encourage
witnesses to testify but as a means of compelling testimony from wit-
nesses who might otherwise assert the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.114
112. Id. at 1348; accord id. (finding that “together, [the statutes] manifest a Congressional
intent to allow testimony obtained by the court’s grant of immunity, but to criminalize the gift,
offer, or promise of any other thing of value for or because of testimony”).
113. Id.
114. A promise from the prosecutor or law enforcement personnel not to prosecute a wit-
ness on the basis of information provided by the witness is not the same as a grant of immunity.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1994) (authorizing the judge or person presiding over a proceeding
to compel the testimony of a witness invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege by issuing an or-
der of immunity prohibiting the government from using the testimony or information against
the witness in a criminal proceeding); Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524, 527-29 (11th Cir. 1982) (en-
forcing a promise by law enforcement officers not to prosecute a witness who agreed to testify
for the state and finding that the government should be required to honor such promises made
by prosecutors and law enforcement officers where the agreement induced the defendant to
waive her Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. Cooke, 650 F. Supp. 991, 993-94 (D.
Md. 1987) (distinguishing a grant of immunity from an informal promise by law enforcement
personnel not to use statements against a criminal defendant); In re Kelly, 350 F. Supp. 1198,
1199-200 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (distinguishing a grant of immunity from an agreement not to prose-
cute but finding that where the prosecution has promised not to use testimony provided by an-
other witness against the witness, the witness “receives, in effect, use immunity from prosecu-
tion”); see also Robert M. Schoenhaus, Annotation, Prosecutor’s Power to Grant Prosecution
Witness Immunity from Prosecution, 4 A.L.R.4th 1221 (1981); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, En-
forceability of Agreement by Law Enforcement Officials Not to Prosecute if Accused Would Help
in Criminal Investigation or Would Become Witness Against Others, 32 A.L.R.4th 990 (1984).
Once immunity has been granted by the court, it is absolute and cannot be qualified or revoked
as long as the witness complies with the order to testify with immunity. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(stating that once immunity has been granted and the witness testifies as a result of the immu-
nity, “no testimony or other information compelled under the order . . . may be used against the
witness in any criminal case”); United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 681-83 (1998) (finding that
the “only condition on the government when it decides to offer immunity in place of the privi-
lege to stay silent [in order to compel testimony] is the requirement to provide an immunity as
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As the preceding discussion makes clear, applying the Nardone
canon of statutory construction is complicated and involves a number
of difficult interpretive questions. Courts on both sides of the debate
have found support in Nardone for their interpretations of subsection
201(c)(2) but have been unable to completely dispel the reasoning of
courts that have reached the opposite interpretive conclusion. The
disparate applications of the Nardone canon of statutory interpreta-
tion to subsection 201(c)(2) can only be resolved through an analysis
conducted by the Supreme Court. Since that is unlikely to occur soon,
other solutions to this interpretive struggle should be considered.
IV.  THE IMBALANCE THAT CONGRESS AND THE COURTS FAILED
TO CONSIDER
Although other circuit courts have followed Singleton II in find-
ing that that subsection 201(c)(2) does not apply to the government
or to officers of the government,115 it remains unclear whether Single-
ton I or Singleton II constitutes the correct interpretation of the gra-
tuity statute. Since the courts must interpret subsection 201(c)(2) as it
is written, with little guidance from legislative history or rules of
statutory construction, debate over the proper interpretation and ap-
plication of the statute will remain until Congress addresses the
source of the problem: the statute’s ambiguous text.116
broad as the privilege itself” (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972))). A
promise not to seek charges, while possibly binding on the government as a contractual agree-
ment, may be limited by any number of terms or conditions. See Rowe, 676 F.2d at 527-29 (ap-
plying a “contractual analysis” to the issue of whether the defendant complied with the terms of
an agreement that promised that no charges would be brought against the defendant if he com-
plied with the agreement); United States v. San Pedro, 781 F. Supp. 761, 763-65 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(considering whether the defendant complied with the conditions and terms of a plea agreement
where the government promised to drop two of the three charges against the defendant in ex-
change for his testimony and cooperation).
115. See United States v. Richardson, No. 98-4139, 1999 WL 686892 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1999);
United States v. Hunte, No. 97-1987, 1999 WL 649627 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 1999); United States v.
Lara, 181 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1999);
United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092
(8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ram-
sey, 165 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 1795 (1999); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1348 (1999).
116. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d 1297, 1310 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (Kelly, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999):
This court must perform its constitutional duties and no more. Ours is not to explore
the farthest meanings that the term “whoever” can bear so as to effectuate the policy
we think best. Our duty is to interpret the plain meaning of the statute. . . . If the bal-
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While Congress has the exclusive authority to clarify the lan-
guage of subsection 201(c)(2), it has not seriously attempted to do so.
On July 15, 1998, Senator Leahy of Vermont introduced Senate Bill
2314 proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 201(c),117 but the bill died in the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Specifically, Senate Bill 2314 proposed
to amend subsection 201(c) to exclude the federal government and
government agents from all of its parts.118
The lack of action on Senate Bill 2314 may indicate that Con-
gress has decided to leave the interpretation of subsection 201(c)(2)
as it currently stands. Since the bill would codify the same govern-
ment exception from the gratuity statute that the courts have read
into the statute, this conclusion seems logical. Because only Congress
can finally clarify the proper meaning of this important yet imprecise
statute, however, merely presuming congressional intent from Con-
gress’s lack of action is not a satisfactory resolution.119 Congress
should reevaluate the purpose and effect of subsection 201(c)(2) and
amend the law to clearly define the authority of the federal govern-
ment and government agents in making plea bargains with criminal
defendants in exchange for testimony.
Congress needs to take two steps in reexamining the proper pur-
pose and application of subsection 201(c)(2). The first step is to
evaluate whether allowing prosecutors to offer leniency and other
consideration in exchange for testimony meets the interests of public
policy. Given the longstanding tradition of this commonly accepted
practice in our criminal justice system, the probable conclusion is that
public policy favors allowing prosecutors to make such bargains. Sec-
ond, Congress must consider whether defendants receive a fair trial
when prosecutors have the unique ability to offer consideration (with
all its attendant advantages) to encourage reluctant witnesses to tes-
tify. If public policy demands that we allow prosecutors to make such
deals, perhaps fairness dictates that we permit defendants an oppor-
tunity to do the same.” Only after weighing both policy concerns and
ance struck by § 201 is to be reweighed, that reweighing should be done by the poli-
cymaking branch of government—the Congress, and not the courts.
117. See S. 2314, 105th Cong. (1998).
118. See id. § 1.
119. Cf. Morgen A. Sullivan, “A Derelict in the Stream of the Law”: Overruling Baseball’s
Antitrust Exemption, 48 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1276-82 (1999) (explaining why Congress’s inaction
may not signify congressional acceptance of judicial interpretations in the context of baseball’s
antitrust exemption).
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defendants’ constitutional guarantee of a fair trial can Congress effec-
tively and appropriately resolve the debate that Singleton I initiated.
A. Public Policy Interests in Bargaining for Testimony
The first step in reconsidering subsection 201(c)(2) is to decide
whether it is in the public interest to continue allowing plea bargain-
ing in exchange for testimony. In criminal prosecutions, the govern-
ment acts on behalf of the people in seeking efficient and effective
criminal justice. Many prosecutions depend heavily on the testimony
of co-conspirators and accomplices as evidence against the defendant.
Prohibiting prosecutors from entering into plea bargains in exchange
for testimony would make it much more difficult to prosecute crimes,
such as drug trafficking conspiracies, where there are few potential
witnesses who were not involved in the criminal activities at some
level.120 This reality provides a strong public policy justification for
continuing to permit prosecutors to make plea agreements that ex-
change leniency for testimony.
Nevertheless, while offering plea bargains in exchange for testi-
mony may be efficient and effective, investigating and prosecuting
crimes is not the only societal concern in the criminal justice system,
as Judge Kelly noted in his dissent in Singleton II.121 Congress should
also consider society’s interest in “maintaining the integrity, fairness,
and credibility of our system of criminal justice. Criminal judgments
are accepted by society at large, and even by individual defendants,
only because our system of justice is painstakingly fair.”122 Thus, Con-
gress must balance the important role played by prosecutorial discre-
tion to plea bargain with society’s interest in maintaining a criminal
justice system that is fair to defendants.
Criminal defendants who have the opportunity to exchange tes-
timony against another defendant for prosecutorial leniency have an
incentive to promise to testify to whatever facts will most help the
120. See Haese, 162 F.3d at 366 (“[F]requently the most knowledgeable witnesses available
to testify about criminal activity are other co-conspirators.”); United States v. White, 27 F. Supp.
2d 646, 649 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (“[W]ithout such testimony, the government would be unable to
enforce drug laws, prosecute organized crime figures under RICO, or otherwise effectively pro-
ceed in the thousands of cases each year in which it relies on witnesses who testify in return for
leniency.”); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“[T]here are situa-
tions where those [indicted co-conspirators] may be the only credible witnesses of criminal ac-
tivity, and, without their testimony, the government would not be able to obtain convictions.”).
121. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1309 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
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prosecution’s case, truthful or not.123 As J. Richard Johnston noted,
perhaps it is a fundamental belief in “the prosecutor’s ‘higher duty’
not to merely obtain a conviction, but also to seek justice” that allows
us to believe that the government will not take advantage of the abil-
ity to make plea agreements in order to induce favorable but untruth-
ful testimony.124 Nevertheless, the courts have recognized the substan-
tial risk that a witness will be motivated to lie in order to get a
favorable plea bargain from the prosecution.125 In United States v.
Cervantes-Pacheco,126 for example, the Fifth Circuit admitted that “[i]t
is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement
of a reduced sentence.”127
Even recognizing these risks, there are persuasive public policy
reasons to continue allowing the government to offer leniency to a
criminal defendant in exchange for testimony against another crimi-
nal defendant. As Senator Leahy argued when introducing Senate
Bill 2314, Congress must “insure that prosecutors have the tools they
need to do their jobs effectively, and being able to enter into coopera-
tion agreements is critical.”128 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has noted
that “[i]t is an occupational hazard of prosecutors that to prove the
guilt of a criminal defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, they often
must rely on the testimony of other criminal defendants, many of
whom are less than enthusiastic about assisting the prosecution.”129
Disallowing the exchange of leniency for testimony would limit
prosecutors to testimony of other criminal defendants that is “volun-
tarily provided without hope of benefit to the volunteer, [which]
123. See Justin M. Lungstrum, Note, United States v. Singleton: Bad Law Made in the Name
of a Good Cause, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 749, 766 (1999) (arguing that “it goes without saying that
pleasing the prosecutor is in the best interest of the defendant” and that the “unfortunate result
is that some cooperators may embellish or outright lie in the name of self-preservation to make
their assistance as substantial as possible”).
124. J. Richard Johnston, Paying the Witness: Why Is It OK for the Prosecution, but Not the
Defense, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1997, at 21, 24.
125. See United States v. McCallie, 554 F.2d 770, 771-72 (6th Cir. 1977) (“Accomplice testi-
mony, of course, is not barred in criminal prosecutions, although the courts recognize the dan-
ger that it may be self-serving and unreliable.”).
126. 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 315.
128. 144 CONG. REC. S8248 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
129. United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348
(1999).
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would . . . seriously undermine the ability of prosecutors to prose-
cute.”130
As shown, there are several persuasive public policy justifications
that support allowing federal prosecutors to enter into plea agree-
ments that exchange leniency for testimony. These justifications have
been at the heart of every opinion disagreeing with the Singleton I in-
terpretation of subsection 201(c)(2), whether they were forcefully ar-
ticulated or not. Given these policy considerations and the long-
standing tradition of prosecutorial plea bargaining, Congress would
likely have no difficulty concluding that the practice should be al-
lowed to continue.
B. The Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial
Although the public interest in an efficient and effective criminal
justice system is significant, there is an equally strong interest in en-
suring that criminal trials are fair to the defendants. From the reason-
able doubt standard to the Miranda warnings, the American criminal
justice system has been developed to meet the promise of the Fifth
Amendment that every person is entitled to a fair trial. In reconsid-
ering the provisions of subsection 201(c)(2), Congress needs to evalu-
ate whether allowing only the prosecutor in a criminal trial to offer
valuable incentives to witnesses is fair to the defendant.
The judicial system has admitted, to some extent, the conflict be-
tween the government’s interest in a justice system that facilitates
conviction of criminals and one that protects a defendant’s interest in
a fair trial. Recognition of this conflict is evidenced in the procedural
rules that have been implemented in an attempt to strike a balance
between allowing unrestricted prosecutorial discretion to make plea
bargains and protecting the rights of defendants in the criminal judi-
cial process. Prosecutors are currently required to disclose to the de-
fense the details of any plea agreements the prosecutors have entered
into in exchange for a witness’s testimony.131 The defense may cross-
examine such witnesses about their plea agreements with the prosecu-
tion and may question the effects that the plea bargains have on the
130. Id.; accord United States v. Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(finding that the plea bargaining process is “a necessary investigatory and prosecutorial activity”
and that “[t]he holding of the Singleton [I] panel would dangerously disable the government’s
investigatory and prosecutorial powers”).
131. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
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credibility of these witnesses’ testimony.132 The underlying rationale
for this approach is that the jury may then evaluate the proper weight
to give to a witness’s testimony by considering any possible motive
the witness would have to be a favorable but untruthful witness for
the prosecution.133
The disclosure requirement and the right to question prosecution
witnesses about plea agreements may provide some protections for a
criminal defendant, but they are designed more to prevent prosecuto-
rial witness tampering than to guarantee defendants a fair trial. As
Judge Kelly argued in his dissent in Singleton II:
Constitutional law manifests another vital legal tradition which the
government’s position undercuts—the policy of ensuring a level
playing field between the government and defendant in a criminal
case. The Supreme Court long ago recognized that impartiality in
criminal cases requires that “[b]etween [the accused] and the state
the scales are to be evenly held.134
Allowing prosecutors to offer something as valuable as personal free-
dom to potential witnesses in exchange for favorable testimony seems
to conflict with the constitutional guarantee of the Fifth Amendment
and certainly does not maintain a balanced scale between the parties.
C. Balancing Fairness and Public Policy by Repealing Subsection
201(c)(2)
Only a legislative solution, and not a judicial one, can properly
balance the public policy interest in allowing prosecutors to plea bar-
gain with witnesses without unfairly tipping the scales against defen-
dants. Congress should repeal subsection 201(c)(2)135 and allow both
the prosecution and the defense to offer gratuities, but not bribes, in
exchange for witness testimony. Congress should then adopt clear
disclosure requirements that require both parties to reveal the exis-
tence and extent of the deals they made to encourage witness testi-
mony.
132. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986).
133. See id. at 679.
134. Singleton II, 165 F.3d 1297, 1314 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371
(1999) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
135. As mentioned in the Introduction to this Note, this suggestion includes the companion
statute found in § 201(c)(3) with regard to accepting such things of value offered in violation of
§ 201(c)(2). As they are companion statutes, they should be considered together.
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Subsection 201(c)(2) is not necessary to the legislature’s goal of
deterring the purchase of false testimony. Subsection 201(b)(3) sets
adequate parameters of acceptable behavior for both the prosecution
and the defense even in the absence of subsection 201(c)(2). Under
subsection 201(b)(3):
Whoever . . . directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or prom-
ises anything of value to any person, or offers or promises such per-
son to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with in-
tent to influence the testimony under oath or affirmation of such . . .
person as a witness . . . shall be fined under this title . . . or impris-
oned for not more than fifteen years, or both . . . .136
Thus, if either the prosecution or the defense offers a witness consid-
eration with the intent to gain false testimony, she is in violation of
subsection 201(b)(3) and is subject to much more severe penalties
than are available under subsection 201(c)(2).137 Although repealing
subsection 201(c)(2) altogether may make it somewhat more difficult
to uncover and prosecute witness tampering, this approach balances
the interests of the government in obtaining criminal convictions
through the use of co-defendant testimony with the constitutional
right of defendants to a fair trial.
The only necessary adjunct to repealing subsection 201(c)(2) is
the requirement that the gratuity disclosure requirements currently
imposed on federal prosecutors be made equally applicable to defen-
dants. Once subsection 201(c)(2) were repealed, prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys would be free to offer consideration to witnesses in
exchange for testimony as long as the offer was not made with intent
to corrupt the witness’s testimony. The need of prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys alike to maintain witness credibility will work as an
inherent deterrent against abuse. If the gratuity offered in exchange
for testimony is too great, disclosure of the agreement will hurt the
witness’s credibility—and therefore the credibility of the party calling
the witness.
One of the strengths of repealing subsection 201(c)(2) to resolve
the conflict over its interpretation is the simplicity of the approach.
Deliberate attempts to induce untruthful testimony would still be ille-
gal under the bribery statute, but the playing field between the prose-
136. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
137. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3), with id. § 201(c)(2) (providing for up to 15 years of im-
prisonment and fines in the former, but only up to two years and fines in the latter).
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cution and defense would be leveled. Provided that the consideration
offered to a witness in exchange for testimony did not contravene the
bribery statute, the offering party simply would be required to dis-
close the gratuity so that the court and the jury could consider the ar-
rangement in assessing the witness’s credibility. The gratuity offered
to the witness could include things as simple as a new suit of clothes
to wear at the trial or something intangible yet valuable to the wit-
ness. Obviously, the most common incentive that defendants could
and would offer to potential witnesses would be money. The jury
would consider the amount of money given and weigh that factor in
determining the credibility of the witness. As long as there is no evi-
dence that the defense attorney is attempting to coerce false testi-
mony, then there would be no criminal act. Witnesses do not always
feel motivated to testify by a sense of moral obligation, which is why
federal prosecutors offer leniency in exchange for needed testimony.
Defense attorneys also need methods for inducing uncooperative wit-
nesses to agree to testify on behalf of their clients.138 The defense still
may not be able to offer witnesses anything as valuable as reduced
criminal charges or sentencing leniency, but this is a better approach
than continuing to allow prosecutors to induce reluctant witnesses to
testify while denying any such persuasive techniques to the defense.
CONCLUSION
When Singleton I was announced in July of 1998, the opinion re-
introduced the legislative, judicial, and executive branches to a short
statute that had been little-noticed in the thirty-five years since its en-
actment. Although Singleton I was quickly vacated, the reaction to
the case has been significant. Unfortunately, the discussion of subsec-
tion 201(c)(2) invoked by the Singleton I decision has focused exclu-
sively on the propriety of allowing prosecutors to exchange leniency
for criminal witness testimony, without addressing the underlying
138. Freeing defense counsel to attempt to induce testimony from a witness raises two prac-
tical problems which are beyond the scope of this Note. First, if both the prosecution and de-
fense can offer compensation (including money) for a witness’s testimony, that raises the specter
of an unseemly bidding war for helpful testimony. It seems likely that the jury would view this as
a bribe, or at least not credible testimony, if the price was driven up too much. Second, the abil-
ity to offer financial compensation or inducement may well be of only theoretical comfort for
most defendants. Most criminal defendants will lack the resources to offer much to induce a
witness to testify, and that amount will likely be less valuable to the witness than the plea
agreement offered by the government. All the same, the defendant at least has an opportunity
equal to that of the government in securing helpful testimony.
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question of whether a criminal defendant can receive a fair trial if the
prosecution can induce witnesses to testify while defendants cannot.
Federal prosecutors’ plea bargaining with criminals in exchange
for testimony, although longstanding practice, seems to violate sub-
section 201(c)(2) and that statute’s concern for maintaining the integ-
rity of witnesses’ testimony. Simply creating a government exception
is not an adequate solution because “if the judicial process is tainted
by the admission of unreliable testimony induced by a defendant’s
promises, it is no less tainted by the identical actions of the prosecu-
tor.”139 As Johnston has argued, “compensating a witness for testifying
involves an identical threat to the integrity of the judicial system
whether the witness testifies for the prosecution or the defense. There
is no apparent reason why the rules should be different for the two
sides in a criminal case . . . .”140 If the initial impetus for enacting sub-
section 201(c)(2) over thirty-five years ago was to protect the witness
stand from taints of false testimony, then that should be a factor in
deciding the best course of action now.
Courts have routinely found that the jury is capable of assessing
the credibility of testimony offered by a witness induced to testify by
a plea bargain, provided the terms of the plea agreement are dis-
closed by the prosecution. The same reasoning should apply to
agreements exchanging consideration for testimony between defense
attorneys and defense witnesses. As long as there is no intent to cor-
rupt the testimony, which would constitute an illegal bribe, then there
is no reason that the same rules should not apply to both parties. By
repealing the gratuity statute and creating the same disclosure re-
quirements for both prosecutors and defense attorneys, the credibility
of witnesses will remain a question for the jury, but both parties will
be playing by the same rules.
139. United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
140. Johnston, supra note 124, at 24.
